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ABSTRACT
Cyber attacks are increasingly becoming prevalent and causing
significant damage to individuals, businesses and even countries.
In particular, ransomware attacks have grown significantly over
the last decade. We do the first study on mining insights about
ransomware attacks by analyzing query logs from Bing web search
engine.We first extract ransomware related queries and then build a
machine learning model to identify queries where users are seeking
support for ransomware attacks. We show that user search behavior
and characteristics are correlated with ransomware attacks. We also
analyse trends in the temporal and geographical space and validate
our findings against publicly available information. Lastly, we do
a case study on ‘Nemty’, a popular ransomware, to show that it is
possible to derive accurate insights about cyber attacks by query
log analysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With internet becoming ubiquitous, cyber attacks have become
increasingly prevalent. Cyber attacks have had significant negative
impact and implications in major sectors such as healthcare, finance,
manufacturing, etc. As per a study by the Internet Society [1],
over 5 billion data records were exposed in 2018 and the total cost
of these attacks was estimated to be over $45 billion. There are
several different types of attacks such as phishing, wiretapping,
denial of service, ransomware, etc. In particular, with the advent of
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cryptocurrencies, which are used for making payments to attackers,
ransomware attacks have increased exponentially over the last
decade. Ransomware encrypts and locks the victims’ files until
they pay money to the attackers. The financial damage due to
ransomware attacks is estimated to increase from $8 billion in 2018
to $20 billion in 2021 [1]. Several cities and organizations have been
impacted by these attacks [4] affecting millions of people in the
process.
Given the significance of these attacks, it’s critical to understand
the impact and scale of these attacks. Most of the information avail-
able today is from manually curated public repositories [13] or by
cyber security vendors [2]. However, these suffer from fragmenta-
tion and delays. So, it’s important to explore alternative data sources
and methods to improve our understanding of these attacks. Web
search query logs offer a unique way to do population-scale anal-
ysis [6, 12]. For instance, Paparrizos et al. [15] and Xu et al. [16]
have analyzed health related search queries to predict trends for
various diseases and epidemics. Chancellor et al. [9] have shown
that macro-economic factors like employment demand can be char-
acterized using query logs. In the security domain, Canali et al. [7]
used the browsing history of users to predict the risk of visiting
malicious websites.
In this work, we do the first study to analyze cyber attacks, specif-
ically ransomware, using query logs from Bing, a major web search
engine. We mine ransomware related queries from anonymized
query logs and use machine learning models to extract queries
where users are seeking support for ransomware attacks. This is
critical since we want to analyze queries and sessions where the
users were likely attacked rather than those who were just looking
for information about these attacks. Next, we do feature correla-
tion analysis to understand if search behavior and user attributes
are correlated with attacks. We also report on temporal and geo-
graphic trends for users who were seeking support for ransomware
attacks. Lastly, we do a case study on the Nemty ransomware [8]
and show that just by query log analysis we are able to learn about
the origin and the effectiveness of the attack.
2 DATA
We perform our analysis using the anonymized query logs from
Bing. The analysis is conducted over a four month time span be-
tween July 1st, 2019 and October 31st, 2019. As web search patterns
tend to vary significantly based on several factors, we focus this
study on queries from US region with English locale. However, the
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methodology is generic and can be expanded to other regions and
locales.
2.1 Terminology
Below, we define some key terms that we use throughout the paper:
(1) Ransomware Queries - Queries related to ransomware which
contains the keyword ‘ransomware’ in the query or the clicked
URL(s).
(2) Support Queries - Ransomware queries which indicate that the
user is trying to seek solutions for an attack. Sample queries:
‘how to recover encrypted files’, ‘.besub ransomware decryption
software’.
(3) Non-support Queries - Ransomware queries where the intent
is not to find support or solution for attacks but for seeking
general information, facts, etc. Sample queries: ‘top ransomware
attacks’, ‘20 Texas cities attacked with ransomware’.
(4) Attacked Users - Users who searched for at least one support
query for ransomware attacks.
(5) Safe Users - Users who did not search for any support queries
for attacks. We have randomly sampled one million safe users
for the study.
Limitations: Please note that since the query logs are anonymized,
we lack ground truth about individual users to validate our obser-
vations. However, in Section 5, we show that the insights from this
study are consistent with public information about the attacks.
2.2 Manual Annotation
Owing to the large volume of query logs, manually labeling each
query will be a mammoth task. So, we manually label 1000 queries
and then train a machine learning model to find the support queries
and the attacked users. First, four annotators individually label a
random sample of 200 ransomware queries as either support queries
or non-support queries. We then calculate the inter-annotator agree-
ment score using Fleiss kappa [10]. With the resulting score be-
ing 94.21, translating to almost perfect agreement, each of the four
annotators were asked to label a disjoint set of 200 samples each.
Including the initial set of 200 samples, a labeled dataset of 1000
samples was created with support queries being 32.8% of the data.
2.3 Support Query Classification
The labeled data (see Section 2.2) is then processed before we train
a binary classification model. We tokenize the query string and the
clicked URLs and compute the word embeddings of tokens that
are not stopwords using a pretrained Word2Vec model [14]. The
individual token embeddings are then aggregated together resulting
in a 300 dimension feature vector. Several classification models are
trained on the data and the five-fold cross validation scores are
reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of support query classifiers with 5-fold CV.
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
Decision Tree 83.6 80 81 81
Random Forest 89.1 94 70 80
LinearSVC 93.20 94 89 91
Gaussian SVM 92.6 98 87 92
We observe that LinearSVC is the best performing model with
the highest five-fold cross validation accuracy of 93.2% and a F1
score of 91. For the 158, 001 ransomware queries that were found
in the four month duration, the trained LinearSVC model was used
to derive the inference labels. A total of 12, 357 unique users were
identified as attacked users which corresponds to 11.64% of the total
users that searched for ransomware queries. The resulting dataset,
which is a union of all the queries searched for by the attacked
users and the safe users, comprises of 23, 439, 988 queries out of
which 8, 957, 348 queries belong to attacked users.
3 USER BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
The data collected from the previous section is analysed to identify
the behavioral differences in attacked users and safe users. To this
end, we identify different features and group them into different
categories based on the type of behaviour it indicates. The list of
categories and the corresponding features are as follows:
• Volume of search - number of queries, number of adult queries,
dwell time, clicks, sat clicks (clicks where the dwell time is more
than 30s [11]).
• Diversity in searches - unique URL domains.
• Time of search - morning (6AM - 7PM), evening (7PM - 12AM)
or night (12AM - 6AM)
• Day of the week - weekday (Monday to Friday) or weekend
(Saturday and Sunday).
• Device used - device type, operating system and browser type.
Along with the total counts, we normalize the features at a ses-
sion level as well as the user level. The feature values are computed
for all users in the dataset. We then analyse the differences in distri-
bution of feature values for all attacked users and safe users. Table
2 summarises the percentage difference in mean values of the fea-
ture distributions of attacked users and safe users where the feature
values are aggregated at a session level. Note that only the features
where the percentage difference was higher than 100% are shown
in the table.
Table 2: Feature comparison for attacked & safe users.
Feature Percent
Difference
Total Number Of Queries 192.16
Total Number Of Adult Queries 191.91
Total Number Of Clicks 193.25
Total Number Of Unique URL Domains 193.22
Total Number Of Sat Clicks 193.49
Total Dwell Time 193.55
Total Number Of Requests At Morning 184.22
Total Number Of Requests At Evening 196.72
Total Number Of Requests At Night 188.81
Total Number Of Requests On Weekday 189.21
Total Number Of Requests On Weekend 189.13
Mean Total Number Of Queries 107.84
Mean Total Number Of Adult Queries 103.21
Mean Total Number Of Clicks 110.38
Mean Total Number Of Unique URL Domains 110.64
Mean Total Number Of Sat Clicks 127.80
Mean Total Dwell Time 130.40
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Figure 1: Spearman’s correlation coefficients between features and being attacked by ransomware.
Following the feature comparison, a feature correlation analysis
is carried out using Spearman’s correlation coefficient [17] as it is
able to capture monotonic relationships between variables without
assuming the data to be of normal distribution. The values of the
coefficient range from −1 to 1 to denote negative and positive cor-
relations. Once the coefficients are computed, the confidence of the
results obtained is tested via a standard significance test. The cor-
relation value of a feature is considered statistically significant if
the significance level (or p-value) is less than 0.05 indicating a con-
fidence level of 95%. Figure 1 summarizes the set of features which
satisfy this threshold condition. It is evident from the coefficient
values that there is very weak or no correlation between the vari-
ables and likeliness of being attacked by ransomware.
An interesting observation made was that attacked users gen-
erally had a much higher search volume compared to safe users
which implies that the more the users searches the web, the more
likely they are to be attacked. There was also significant positive
correlation between the percentage of queries searched at night
time and a negative correlation for percentage of queries searched
in the morning indicating that users are more likely to get attacked
at night time. Another interesting behavior seen was that attacked
users had higher positive correlations with adult queries.
4 TREND ANALYSIS
4.1 Hourly Trends
We analyzed how the behaviour of attacked users seeking solutions
to ransomware attacks changes at each hour of the day by plotting
hourly trends emerging from our dataset. Figure 2 shows that users
were searching for solutions mostly during non-working hours
(outside of the 9AM - 5PM window). This makes sense as users who
are really determined to mitigate ransomware attacks on their own,
by leveraging web search, are sparing some focused time outside
of their regular working hours to find solutions. However, it could
also be that the regular web search volume is very high during
those hours. To better understand the trend, we plotted a graph
shown in Figure 3 that shows the normalized distribution of ratio
of support queries and how it is varying at different hours of the
day. This bolsters our earlier finding (i.e., users spend more time
searching for solutions outside of working hours) and highlights
the fact that a lot of search activity to find solutions to ransomware
attacks happens between 6PM - 11PM, which makes sense as this
Figure 2: Hourly distribution of support queries.
Figure 3: Hourly distribution of normalized support query ratio.
is the time window where users usually spare more focused time
for finding solutions to their non-work problems.
4.2 Geographical Trends
In this study we focused on understanding how the search trends
vary across different states in the US. In Figure 4 (left) we plotted
a heat map of how the volume of support queries vary across
different states in the US. Noticeably, states that are large (in size
or population or internet penetration), like California, Texas, New
York, is where a lot of activity is seen. However, this could also
be because the total search volume in these states is generally
higher. To better understand which states record higher volumes
of ransomware queries, we normalized the data by calculating the
ratio of support queries compared to non-support queries in that
state. This yielded some interesting insights, as seen in Figure 4
(right): states like North Dakota, Arkansas, Oklahoma is where the
ratio of support queries is high though the overall search volume is
low (compared to states like California or Texas). This can also be
intuitively correlated to the massive ransomware attacks that were
seen in various schools and public offices in states like North Dakota
and Arkansas in the year 2019 [3, 5], which could have caused users
in these states to record a higher normalized support query ratio.
5 CASE STUDY
We present a case study to see if we can learn insights about specific
attacks using query log analysis . We looked at all recent (second
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Figure 4: Distribution of support seeking query searches by US state
(absolute numbers on the left and normalized ratios on the right).
Figure 5: Timeline of news and query logs insights about Nemty.
Figure 6: Volume of queries about Nemty per 4-day periods.
half of 2019) ransomware attacks with significant impact listed
by the NJ Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell
(NJCCIC)1. For this study, we focus on the Nemty [8] ransomware,
however our technique generalizes to any attack.
Nemty is a ransomware that infects Windows OS users, encrypts
their files, searches and deletes any shadow copies of these files, and
finally asks victims to pay a ransom for restoring their data. Nemty
started affecting users end of August 2019, and spread worldwide
through distribution campaigns during September, October and
November 2019, as seen in the timeline of Figure 5 (black boxes
above the timeline show published news about Nemty [8]).
We gathered attack-related search engine query logs (with Eng-
lish locale) about Nemty between the start of August to end of No-
vember 2019 from all countries. We then classified the queries as
support and non-support using our ML model (see Section 2.3). Fi-
nally, we analyzed the results to gain insights about Nemty, such
as when the ransomware started infecting users and how its dis-
tribution evolved over time (see blue boxes below the timeline in
Figure 5). Our insights found trends related to the distribution of
1https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/
Nemty that start days before they are reported in the news [8]. This
result shows that our query log analysis technique could be used
to timely learn about the origin and effectiveness of a ransomware
attack, even in the early days of its distribution.
In Figure 6, we show the number of such queries per 4-day
periods between August and November 2019. We see that until
08/19, there were no queries about Nemty. However, users started
submitting support queries on 08/20, which is likely when the
ransomware started first spreading. Indeed, on 08/26 the first news
about Nemty are published [8] (see Figure 5). On 09/14, an article [8]
discusses how the Nemty authors are enhancing the ransomware
with the goal of achieving a wider distribution. Our analysis indeed
found that although the support queries started declining early
September, on 09/09 there was a spike in such queries (see Figure 6).
The insight we gained from this corresponds to the news about the
ransomware becoming more efficient and sophisticated.
There was a tremendous increase in support and non-support
queries about Nemty between 10/03 and 10/06 (see Figure 6). Pub-
lished news confirm this finding, as there was a new distribution
campaign during October that was targeting enterprise users [8].
We found that Nemty was now spreading worldwide, as support
queries started being submitted by an increasing number of coun-
tries. After this period of time, the support queries started decreas-
ing, most likely because more people became aware of the ran-
somware and how to protect from it. In early November there was
a minor increase in the queries (see Figure 6), which corresponds to
a new distribution method of Nemty via Trik botnet. However, this
method was not very efficient, because after this minor increase in
queries, the query volume continued to decline.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we did the first study to find insights about ran-
somware attacks using web search logs. We analyzed query logs
from a major web search engine using a machine learning classi-
fier to extract support queries by users who were attacked by ran-
somware. We did a correlation analysis and found that certain fea-
tures such as query volume and click counts are correlated with at-
tacks. Further, we analyzed geographical and temporal trends and
validated our findings from publicly available information. Lastly,
we did a case study on the Nemty ransomware and showed that
with query log analysis, it is possible to mine key insights about
the origin and spread of specific attacks.
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